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Summary: The dominance of the orthodox paradigm over the last decades
prior to the “great recession” left no room for the notion of “endogenous money”
in the development of economic theory. However, this alternative direction of
the causality of demand for money-credit and economic activity has been 
present in the heterodox economic thought since the 1930s and should be
reconsidered in the current situation. In this context, the numerous episodes of 
housing bubbles, which have been taking place since 2007, create the perfect
“environment” to explore the notion of “dynamic monetized production econo-
my”. Our theoretical framework is estimated econometrically by using a sample 
of 6 developed economies which spans from 1970 to 2011. The non-stationary 
“nature” of our data recommends the use of cointegration techniques (Søren
Johansen 1995) in order to estimate our models.
Key words: Bank credit, Collateral channel, Financial wealth, Housing market, 
Cointegration. 
JEL: C22, R31.
 
 
 
 
In the last decade, one notion has become extremely popular in housing economics, 
i.e. the “collateral” channel. After the collapse of the housing market that led to the 
“great recession” a great deal of research has explored how abundant credit contri-
butes to fuel rising housing prices. However, the causality between housing prices 
and credit has been overlooked by the vast majority of the housing literature. The 
theoretical essence of this controversy finds its roots in the large discussion regarding 
the endogenous nature of money.   
The development of the housing literature along these lines is related to the 
debate of the endogeneity of the credit-money. This premise, which has been rejected 
by the orthodox economic thought, should be reconsidered. In this context, our pro-
posal elaborates a theoretical framework which explains credit demand as a function 
of demand for housing assets. In doing so, this contribution re-visits the notion of 
“dynamic monetized production economy” initially proposed by Augusto Graziani 
(2003). 
In the second part of our analysis our theoretical proposition is tested by 
means of a multivariate cointegration technique (Johansen 1995). In doing so, a sam-
ple of 6 developed countries which spans from 1970 to 2011 is employed. Particular-
ly, the following economies are studied: Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Irel-
and and the United Kingdom.  
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The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows. Section 1 examines 
the notion of the “collateral” channel. Section 2 presents our testable hypothesis. In 
Section 3 the econometric technique, which is employed, is discussed. Section 4 
summarizes the data sources and presents our sample. Section 5 presents and dis-
cusses our empirical results. Finally, some conclusions, along with a summary, are 
provided in Section 6.  
 
1. Literature Review: The “Collateral” Channel  
 
The majority of the existing body of research on housing issues is based on the pre-
mise that demand for housing can be driven by supply of credit (John V. Duca, John 
Muellbauer, and Anthony Murphy 2013; Manuel Adelino, Antoinette Schoar, and 
Felipe Severino 2012 also deal with this aspect where empirical evidence is provided 
to support the assumption that easy access to credit fuels housing prices). In this con-
text, there is a basic concept, which has been discussed deeply and it is fundamental 
for our purpose, i.e. the “collateral” channel. Prior to the explanation of this notion in 
the next section, a review of its theoretical roots, i.e. the “financial accelerator” or 
“credit multiplier”, is required.  
The existence of the “financial accelerator” (Ben S. Bernanke and Mark L. 
Gertler 1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist 1996, 1999) is supported by 
three main arguments: (a) internal finance is always more affordable than external 
finance, independently of the value of the collateral, which backs the loan; this is due 
to lenders’ agency costs; (b) agents’ risk premium is negatively related to their net 
wealth, i.e. internal funds (liquid assets) and collateral (illiquid assets); and (c) a de-
cline in agents’ net wealth induces a hike in the risk premium, which provokes a rise 
in the volume of external funds that borrowers require and finally slows down bor-
rowers’ spending and production (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996; Nobuhiro 
Kiyotaki and John Moore 1997). Specifically, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1996) focus on the empirical evidence in which small variations, for example, oil 
price fluctuations or changes in monetary policy, provoke an important effect on ag-
gregate economic activity. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (op. cit.) define the “fi-
nancial accelerator” as the amplification of real or monetary shocks in the economy 
due to variations in credit conditions. This notion suggests that variations in credit-
market conditions enhance and extend the impact, which emanates from monetary or 
real shocks. In this context any kind of negative shock, which curb the economic ex-
pansion, hardens financial conditions and complicates the entrance of agents in the 
credit market while agents’ credit necessities are increasing. As a result, there is a 
slowdown of spending, which accelerates the downturn of the economy. Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) also coin the term “flight to quality”, which refers to a 
situation where agents have to deal with higher agency cost and as a result the vo-
lume of credit that they can receive is lower. This kind of problems is peculiar in a 
recessionary stage of the economy.  
The “financial accelerator” approach is along the same lines that other contri-
butions, for example, Stewart C. Myers (1984) and Steven M. Fazzari, Glenn R. 
Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen (1988), which suggest firms get into intermediate 
debt instead of financing by external equity when they are obliged to do it. Although  
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it is true that companies consider internal resources as the cheapest and preferred 
alternatives to finance their activities. 
 
2. Demand for Bank Credit 
 
The theoretical framework, which is elaborated for the purpose of this contribution is 
rooted in the “dynamic monetized production economy”, which is modified in order 
to provide an explanation of evolution of demand for mortgages.  
To begin with the “dynamic monetized production economy”, which is due to 
Graziani (2003), is presented. Graziani (op. cit.) describes the monetary “circuit” as a 
process in five steps. Graziani (2003) suggests that the development of the “circula-
tion” approach relies on three pillars: (i) the French School, where Jacques Le Bour-
va (1962) and Alain Parguez (1979) are the most important contributors; (ii) the An-
glo-Saxon view, which was developed by John M. Keynes (1930) and Joan Robinson 
(1956); and (iii) Paolo Sylos Labini (1948), who defends the idea that the money 
stock is endogenously created in order to satisfy firms’ demand for credit. 
Sylos Labini’s (1948) approach was conflicting with the dominant orthodox 
Italian thought of the time. First, banks grant credit to firms, this is the so called “ini-
tial finance”, which permit them to initiate the production process. Before starting the 
mentioned process firms hire their workers. As a result, firms demand the volume of 
credit that they need to pay the wage bill. Once the wages are paid, final or interme-
diate goods are produced. There is equivalence between the wage bill and the cost of 
the goods, which are produced. In this step, banks and firms negotiate the volume of 
credit and its cost, i.e. the interest rate. In the second step, wage earners decide to 
utilize their income for several purposes: consumption, bank deposits or acquisition 
of securities. Thirdly, consumer goods are purchased by wage earners. Investment 
goods are exchanged among firms. The acquisition of consumer goods and securities 
permits money to flow back to the companies, which use it to repay their initial 
debts. Money is destroyed when debts are paid, i.e. the circuit is closed. Then, money 
creation takes place when the banking sector grants new loans to the companies. 
Firms can also use the resources that they obtain from the sales of their production 
and the issue of their securities to start the new production process instead of repay-
ing their debts, which mean a renewal of their credits. However, if wage earners do 
not spend all their income, firms are not able to repay completely their debts and 
there is a fraction of the initial money, which is not destroyed. In that case, the fi-
nancing of a new production cycle means an increase in the total money stock. Final-
ly, the payment of the interests of the loans has to be discussed. Particularly, firms 
can only face the payment of the interests by selling a part of their production, or 
issuing securities for the banks. If the public sector is introduced in this scheme, its 
deficit could give the resources that firms need to pay the interest of the loan. How-
ever, this deficit means public debt towards the central bank since the public sector 
cannot obtain the resources that it needs to repay the deficit issued when it trans-
ferred the financial resources that firms needed. 
Graziani (2003) also highlights some discrepancies between the first genera-
tion of Post Keynesian scholars and the circuit theorists, since for the former group 
there is no room for the supply of money. Particularly, they downgrade this element  
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due to the fact that they assume that money supply is perfectly elastic. Moreover, 
they also consider that in those cases where the central bank limits the amount of 
loans which can be provided by commercial banks, potential borrowers will find 
another source of liquidity; for instance, credit granted by single individuals. As a 
result, the relationship between banks and companies is ignored. However, the 
second generation of Post Keynesian authors and the circuit theorists explore in de-
tail the interaction between both sectors. 
This theoretical framework can be modified and adapted to the particular case 
of the housing market by assuming that all the flows of real estate assets, which are 
produced in the economy in response to households’ housing demand require pre-
vious creation of credit. In other words, there will be no activity in the housing mar-
ket if there is no issuance of those mortgages, which are necessary to materialize the 
purchase of real estate assets.  
As in other markets, the demand function of an asset will be driven by its 
price, P, and some other determinants. As advanced in the previous section, housing 
literature points to the importance of the “collateral” channel, which is related to pre-
dictable variations in the value of real estate assets and impacts current consumption 
(Norm Miller, Liang Peng, and Michael A. Sklarz 2011). These fluctuations have 
played a fundamental role in the dynamics of the housing market and the emergence 
of the “great recession”. Specifically, Kosuke Aoki, James Proudman, and Gertjan 
W. Vlieghe (2001) hypothesize that an increase in the value of those assets, which 
back credit, reduce agency costs. This means a relaxation of the requirements that 
borrowers have to satisfy and a lower risk prime. In particular, this mechanism can 
be described as follows. Increasing dwelling prices means a rise in the volume of 
resources that home buyers have to borrow, which fuels demand for credit. At the 
same time, this increase in housing prices means higher households’ wealth, which 
enhances their mortgage equity withdrawal and reduces the risk that lenders have to 
assume. This mechanism is self-reinforcing, since more abundant and cheaper credit 
favours demand for housing and hikes in real estate prices. For instance, Roberto 
Cardarelli et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence, which supports the “collateral” 
channel. Particularly, Cardarelli et al. (op. cit.) reach the following conclusions: (1) 
the effect of housing demand shocks on consumption is stronger than the influence of 
housing supply shocks; (2) the more developed the mortgage market is the stronger 
the impact of housing demand shocks on consumption; and (3) the role played by 
housing demand shocks has gained importance through time, which was favoured by 
the process of financial deregulation in the 1970s. Specifically, housing demand 
shocks explain a 10-15% of the fluctuations, which occur in GDP and consumption, 
while housing supply shocks explain just a 5-7%. This discussion permits us to in-
clude housing prices as a driver of the demand for bank credit as in Equation (1):  
 
 =      
+ 
(1)
 
where the volume of bank credit, C, is positively related to housing prices, P. The 
sign below a variable indicates the partial derivative of the dependent variable with 
respect to that variable.
 Francisco Carballo-Cruz (2011) is an important contribution  
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in this respect since it deals with the evolution of the banking sector and the housing 
market in the particular case of Spain. 
The demand for credit has been related to equilibrium in the housing market. 
However, further determinants of this equilibrium should be included in our pro-
posed credit relationship, for example, real disposable income per capita, Y, which is 
a proxy of home buyers’ cash flows and is also a key element in the determination of 
housing affordability. In particular, our testable hypothesis points to some co-
movement between real disposable income and the volume of mortgages. The justifi-
cation for this relationship is the fact that in a context characterized by the presence 
of moral hazard problems and “principal-agent” conflicts, commercial banks need to 
define some kind of eligibility criteria to constraint potential demand for credit just to 
those borrowers which are credit-worthy. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) 
also coin the term “flight to quality”, which refers to a situation where agents have to 
deal with higher agency cost and as a result the volume of credit that they can receive 
is lower. This kind of problems is peculiar in a recessionary stage of the economy. 
Moreover, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) point to the existence of a positive 
risk premium as a natural phenomenon in a banking system characterized by the 
presence of “agency” problems. 
Moreover, real disposable income should be included since it is the local fun-
damental of the housing market which better reflects the economic situation. Dimitri 
B. Papadimitriou, Greg Hannsgen, and Gennaro Zezza (2007) highlight the role of 
expectations regarding the availability of credit and expected incomes, which are a 
common driver of housing prices and some macroeconomic aggregates, for example, 
households’ consumption. In terms of our proposed framework, we modify Equation 
(1) as follows: 
 
 =    ,   
+  + 
(2)
 
where all the variables have the same meaning as in Equation (1), with the exemption 
of Y, which accounts for real disposable income.  
In addition to that, the equilibrium in the housing market, as in any other mar-
ket, is defined by a price and a quantity of equilibrium. In the particular case of the 
housing market, the quantity variable is proxied by real residential investment. This 
aggregate measures the flow of new dwelling assets, which are produced in a given 
period in order to meet effective demand. We may note that the real residential in-
vestment exerts a different influence through time. More precisely, an increase in real 
residential investment today means rising supply of housing assets in the long run, 
which will produce a slowdown of housing prices. As a result, there is more home 
buyers that are willing to get into debt to buy new properties, which are now less ex-
pensive than in the past. In this situation, although the amount of funds that a given 
household needs to borrow is lower than in previous periods, we can expect a posi-
tive effect of real residential investment in demand for credit since there are more 
potential homebuyers who enter in the housing market. This example of the so-called 
“fallacy of composition” highlights how there is a negative relationship between cre-
dit and real residential investment on an individual basis, which turns into a positive  
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effect at the aggregate level. However, in the short run there is just one positive and 
unique effect. An increase of real residential investment moves prices and quantities 
of equilibrium in the same direction. As a result, we can expect that rising investment 
in housing assets will increase the volume of mortgages in both levels, i.e. aggregate 
and individual. In terms of our model, we can modify Equation (2) to account for the 
positive impact of real residential investment on the demand for credit: 
   
 =    , ,   
+  +  + 
(3)
 
where all the symbols have the same meaning as in previous equations, and I is real 
residential investment.  
Furthermore, the interest rates of loans for housing should be included in Equ-
ation (3). Our model assumes that commercial banks are willing to provide all those 
financial resources, which are demanded by households. However, not all the de-
mand for credit, which is faced by commercial banks will be satisfied. This is in view 
of the existence of prudential policy measures, which are implemented by the mone-
tary authorities. In particular, central banks should define some standards that poten-
tial borrowers must satisfy if they want to get into debt. In addition to that monetary 
authorities could also influence the evolution of credit by manipulating the basic in-
terest rate, which influences the mortgage rate; i.e. rising interest rates will crowd-out 
some potential borrowers from the credit market since they cannot afford the cost of 
bank finance at these new conditions. Mortgages rates are also relevant in terms of 
our model since they capture institutional factors of the banking system. This is so 
since the prevalence of fixed or variable interest rates in the mortgages contracts 
could “inflate” the length and the strength of those expansionary and recessionary 
stages of the cycle of the housing market. Margarita Rubio (2009) provides empirical 
evidence of the divergences across countries in the context of the EMU in terms of 
credit market. Rubio (op.cit.) highlights the fact that the kind of mortgages which are 
more abundant are an important factor in the transmission of those shocks, which 
take place in the housing market. To make the point, in those countries where the 
collapse of the housing market had more deep consequences, for example, Spain and 
the United Kingdom are characterized by the prevalence of variable mortgages rates.  
In the context of rising stock prices some households will sell their portfolios 
in order to materialize their capital gains, which imply additional resources to finance 
the purchase of dwellings. This also permits the entrance in the market of other home 
buyers who prefer renting the properties instead of acquiring them prior to this in-
crease in their net wealth. In particular interest rates permit the entrance of a larger 
share of potential home buyers during the boom. However, variable interest rates are 
also a “catalyst” of the collapse of the market. This is so since those households who 
obtained this kind of mortgages will experience a rapid increase of their monthly re-
payments in a context of increasing systemic risk. We may also note that in the em-
pirical part of our study this variable is proxied by the long-run interest rate since 
there is no consistent time series for the economies and the period under considera-
tion. In order to account for the rate of interest on loans for housing, the Equation 
presented in (3) is modified to produce Equation (4):  
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 =    , , ,   
+  +  +  – 
(4)
 
where all the variables are as in Equation (3), except for R, which stands for the 
mortgage rate.  
Finally, the evolution of share prices, S, is also included to account for house-
holds’ financial wealth. Fluctuations in stock prices affect individuals’ financial posi-
tion by modifying the value of their portfolios, and as a result, a change in house-
holds’ net wealth takes place. This variation influences their demand for consump-
tion goods and housing assets. In this context there will be more households willing 
to get into debt in order to finance the acquisitions of new properties. In the context 
of rising stock prices some households will sell their portfolios in order to materialize 
their capital gains, which imply additional resources to finance the purchase of dwel-
lings. This also permits the entrance in the market of other home buyers who prefer 
renting the properties instead of acquiring them prior to this increase in their net 
wealth. Variations in stock prices also affect indirectly credit standards; for example, 
an external shock, which pushes up stock prices is understood by the banking system 
as an improvement of the financial position and the solvency of their potential bor-
rowers. In this context, an increase in households’ capacity to get into debt will take 
place. This fluctuation of stock prices also provokes an increase in the value of the 
“collateral” that they own and induces the relaxation of the requirements to obtain a 
loan and slows down the cost of banking finance since this kind of loans is less risky 
(see also, Muellbauer and Gavin Cameron 2000; John Baude 2005). Dimitrios Gou-
nopoulos et al. (2012) consider the inclusion of the stock index as a proxy for activity 
in the financial system. Moreover, Andrea Nobili and Francesco Zollino (2012) sug-
gest an uncertain effect of financial wealth on the demand for credit, since those 
households who are richer will have to accept lower mortgages. However, we can 
expect that the effect, which will prevail, is a positive one since those households 
who are richer will acquire the most expensive properties and maybe several of them. 
Luca Casolaro and Leonardo Gambacorta (2005) suggest a positive relationship be-
tween the volume of credit to finance dwelling acquisitions and the evolution of the 
stock market in the long run, since there is an increase in the value of households’ 
wealth and their possibilities of indebtedness at the aggregate level. They also point 
to a negative relationship between both variables in the short run, based on the possi-
bility that households can consider these two assets, i.e. shares and dwellings, as al-
ternative elements to include in their portfolios. Finally, our testable hypothesis is 
captured by Equation (5):  
 
 =    , , , ,   
+  +  +  –  + 
(5)
 
where the variables are as in Equation (4), except for S, which stands for share prices.  
 
3. Relevant Econometric Technique 
 
All the estimations are conducted by applying cointegration, since some preliminary 
tests clearly show the presence of unit roots in the data. More specifically, the fol- 
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lowing unit root/stationarity tests are applied: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (David 
A. Dickey and Wayne A. Fuller 1979, 1981) tests, the Phillips-Perron (Peter C. B. 
Phillips and Pierre Perron 1988) test, the GLS-based Dickey-Fuller (Charles R. Nel-
son and Charles Plosser 1982) test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (De-
nis Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) test. All of them confirm that our data are integrated of 
first-order. The results of these unit root/stationarity test are available from the au-
thors upon request. 
This is so in order to deal with the lack of stationarity of the data, avoid spu-
rious regressions and model the cointegrating relationships and their short-run dy-
namics along with an error-correction term. Following Richard Harris and Robert 
Sollis (2003) two or more series are cointegrated if there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between them, although the series could include a stochastic trend. Har-
ris and Sollis (2003) recommend to start the estimation procedure by applying a mul-
tivariate vector autoregression (VAR) approach, e.g. Johansen (1995), given that this 
technique does not require to make any kind of assumptions about the potential en-
dogeneity of the variable involved and the number of existing cointegrating relation-
ships. 
More specifically, the Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) developed by 
Johansen (1995) is applied. The potential existence of several cointegrating relation-
ships, the large number of variables that are included in the model, and the presence 
of endogeneity among them, which is recognised by the economic literature in some 
of the cases (for example, real residential investment affects credit, although, at the 
same time the availability of credit could be a driver of real residential investment), 
compels us to utilize a technique that deals with these specific problems, namely en-
dogeneity and reverse causality. However, Johansen’s (1995) approach could lead to 
the identification of cointegrating relationships, which are meaningless from an eco-
nomic point of view. This is so since those results, which are obtained by means of 
Johansen (1995), require detailed review and analysis, i.e. economic explanation and 
identification, in order to evaluate their economic meaning. For the purpose of this 
contribution, we regress the VECM proposed in Equation (6), and we just report 
those relationships, which can be interpreted from a theoretical point of view as in 
Equation (6): 
  
t t i t
n
i
i t H
n
i
C C                 


   1 0
1
12
1
11 0   (6)
 
where C means bank credit; Π is a vector, which includes the following variables: 
real hosuing prices, P, real disposable income, Y, real residential investment, I, mort-
gage rate, R; and the share prices index, S. Equation (6) also includes an error-
correction term, Ε, and µ is a random error term. β0, α0, φ11 and φ12 are the estimated 
coefficients of the VECMs. 
The validity of our results is tested by means of a set diagnostic/statistics. 
More specifically, we report the R-squared (R-sq), the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Cor-
relation LM (Leslie G. Godfrey 1978; Trevor S. Breusch 1979) statistic, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) 
and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC).  
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4. Data 
 
The theoretical framework elaborated in Section 2 is tested econometrically in this 
part of this contribution. In doing so, our theoretical proposition is tested for the fol-
lowing economies: Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. The annual times series under consideration cover the period 1970-2011. 
The length of the time series under analysis is determined by the time coverage of the 
Real House Prices Index, which is available. 
Our sample collects annual data from 4 different data sources: (a) the annual 
macro-economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (AMECO); (b) the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS); (c) the World Bank; and (d) the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Table 1 displays the data provider of those 
time series which compound our sample.  
 
Table 1   Data Sources 
 
Data provider  Source  Time series  
World Bank   http://data.worldbank.org/  Domestic credit to the private sector (% GDP) 
BIS http://www.bis.org/  Real house prices index 
OECD http://stats.oecd.org/  Share  prices 
AMECO  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/
user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm 
Gross fixed capital formation by type of goods at current 
prices (dwelling) 
Gross national disposable income per head of population 
Gross domestic product price deflator 
      Real long-term interest rate 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
We also may note that the collected data present some missing observations, 
which were filled in by using data published by the relevant national statistics agen-
cies, for example, INE in the case of Spain. 
E-Views 5.0 and STATA 11.0 are the econometric packages employed to es-
timate the models and conduct those test which are relevant in the validation of the 
results.   
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
5.1 Cointegrating Relationships 
 
The results of the Johansen’s cointegration test (Johansen 1988, 1991) are shown in 
Table 2. The results presented in the first column indicate the existence of a cointe-
grating relationship in the event of all the credit markets, which are under considera-
tion. The values of the log-likelihood function that are used when analyzing the pos-
sibility of restricting a VAR(n) to another VAR(n-1) are reported in the second col-
umn. Table 2 also shows the eigenvalues and the trace statistics (third and fourth col-
umn respectively), which are calculated to perform this cointegration test. The last 
column presents the critical values at the 5% significance level for the trace statistics. 
These tests confirm that there is some co-movement between the variables under  
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consideration in the long run. Then we proceed to estimate the VECMs, which also 
provide the corresponding cointegrating equations in their normalized form. The 
choice of the lag length which is considered to estimate the VECMs which are pre-
sented in the next section is taken based on the values of the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) and the Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC).  
 
Table 2   Johansen Test for Cointegration 
 
Johansen tests for cointegration              
   Maximum rank  LL  Eigenvalue  Trace statistic  5% critical value 
Australia 1  175.9751  0.4610  29.1564  29.68 
Denmark 1  119.5154  0.1980  0.4402  3.76 
France 1  82.7594  0.3768  1.0552  3.76 
Germany 1  267.7555  0.4368  21.1630  24.31 
Ireland 1  123.4114  0.4206  9.2687  12.53 
UK 1  141.5160  0.5176  19.4983  25.32 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3 presents the estimated cointegrating relationships, which permit us 
to model the equilibrium in the long run. 
 
Table 3   Long-Run Relationships 
 
Long-run relationship - normalized parameters             
   Intercept  L_C  L_P  L_Y  L_I  R  L_S 
Australia 3.055748  1  3.164169*** -0.6558728*** 
Denmark 5.00166  1  -1.232096*** 
France 0.3348008  1  -0.0708784* 
Germany 3.410084  1  -0.2516388*** -0.5572366***
Ireland 6.883062  1  -1.579172***
UK 4.066192  1    -0.7301613** -0.4434546*** 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,  
respectively. Numbers in parentheses, in the case of the variables, show the lag(s) of the relevant variable. 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Our estimations find a positive impact of real housing prices in the case of 
Ireland (1.579). This finding emphasizes the importance of the “collateral” channel 
and the makes evident the link which exist between demand for credit and demand 
for housing assets. Moreover, those cointegrating relationships which are reported in 
Table 3 also suggest a positive effect of real residential investment on credit in the 
case of Germany (0.557) and the United Kingdom (0.730). In addition to that, our 
proxy of households’ cash flows, i.e. real disposable income, is also an important 
determinant of demand for credit in the German economy (0.251). This elasticity is  
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positive as suggested by our theoretical framework. Furthermore, Table 3 reports a 
negative and strong semi-elasticity of the mortgage rate in the case of Australia (-
3.641).  
Finally, the analysis undertaken for the purpose of this contribution highlights 
a positive correlation between households’ financial wealth and bank credit. Specifi-
cally, our results suggest a significant relationship between these elements in the case 
of the United Kingdom (0.443), Denmark (1.232) and Australia (0.656). This effect 
is also significant in France (0.071), although its influence is not as strong as in the 
other three countries mentioned above. Our results show that financial wealth is the 
only explanatory variable of demand for credit in the case of France. This positive 
correlation is also pointed out by Baude (2005). 
All the estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities have the expected and sign. 
These empirical results support our theoretical framework.  
 
5.2 Vector Error-Correction Models 
 
Those Vector Error-Correction Models (VECMs), which have been estimated to 
model credit dynamics in the short run are shown in Table 4a. The validity of all 
these estimations is checked by means of a set of tests which are displayed in Table 
4b and 4c.  
The relationships which are presented in Table 4a highlight the impact of dis-
posable income in the evolution of demand for credit in the short run in the case of 
France (3.826).  
All the error-correction models, which were estimated for the purpose of this 
contribution include an intercept, which is significant in all the cases expect in 
France and Denmark. To model the evolution of bank credit in the short run, lagged 
terms of this variable were included in the corresponding equations. The lowest ef-
fect of the variable is found in the case of the UK economy (0.251). On the other 
hand, the evolution of credit demand in the recent past is an important driver of this 
variable in the German market (0.282).  
 
Table 4a Vector Error-Correction Models (VECMs)   
 
Short-run relationship                      
 
Intercept  ∆L_P  ∆L_Y  ∆L_I  ∆R  ∆L_S  ∆L_C EL_C 
Australia  0.03681***       
0.101686* 
(0)   -0.16672** 
Denmark  -0.042421  0.934740*  
(4)      
0.516881**  
(3)   -0.135968* 
France  -0.083716   
3.826020*  
(2)    
0.403566**  
(0)   -0.672137*** 
Germany  0.009118**          
0.281519*** 
(3)  -0.266409*** 
Ireland  0.039529***  0.425212* 
(0)           -0.176393** 
UK  0.041742***          
0.250604* 
(1)  -0.314173*** 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,  
respectively. Numbers in parentheses, in the case of the variables, show the lag(s) of the relevant variable.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4b VECMs Diagnostics/Statistics I 
 
Diagnostic/statistics short-run relationship          
   R-squared  DW  AIC  SIC  F-statistics 
Australia 0.168886  1.686311  -3.032552 -2.904586  3.657666  (0.0358) 
Denmark 0.217897  2.04737  -0.085906 0.090041  2.971775  (0.0464) 
France 0.494769  1.874427  -0.254457  -0.082079 11.09863  (0.0000) 
Germany 0.405973  1.706129  -4.710435  -4.57982 11.61824  (0.0001) 
Ireland 0.218467  1.461980  -1.959976 -1.83331  5.171433  (0.0105) 
UK 0.306918  1.929656  -1.860157  -1.733491 7.970952  (0.0014) 
 
Note: In the last column numbers in parentheses indicates the p-value of each test. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4c VECMs Diagnostics/Statistics II 
 
Diagnostic/statistics short-run relationship             
   LM (1)  LM (2)  White  White X  ARCH (1)  ARCH (2) 
Australia  0.96507  
(0.3327) 
0.905703  
(0.4138) 
0.288993  
(0.7507) 
0.934718  
(0.4714) 
0.285363  
(0.5965) 
0.189091  
(0.8286) 
Denmark  0.037303  
(0.8481) 
0.169029  
(0.8453) 
1.901627  
(0.1144) 
10.24028  
(0.0000) 
0.001186  
(0.9727) 
0.048930  
(0.9523) 
France  0.377841  
(0.5430) 
1.108106  
(0.3425) 
1.320915  
(0.2775) 
1.957940  
(0.0841) 
0.869321  
(0.3575) 
0.545956  
(0.5844) 
Germany  0.051095  
(0.8226) 
0.875939  
(0.4262) 
0.451841  
(0.6402) 
1.651531  
(0.1759) 
0.003499  
(0.9532) 
0.123984  
(0.8838) 
Ireland  2.752436  
(0.1058) 
1.453673  
(0.2475) 
0.144622  
(0.8655) 
0.156618  
(0.9765) 
0.161931  
(0.6897) 
0.068304  
(0.9341) 
UK  0.098689  
(0.7553) 
1.291132  
(0.2881) 
0.160529  
(0.8523) 
0.477446  
(0.7904) 
0.014482  
(0.9049) 
0.022091  
(0.9782) 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicates the p-value of each test.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
Our econometric analysis confirms the existence of a positive effect, which 
emanates from housing prices, i.e. “collateral” channel, in the case of Denmark 
(0.935) and Ireland (0.425). 
Moreover, the level of activity of the housing market, which is proxied by real 
residential investment, does not play a significant role in the dynamics of the credit 
market. This lack of impact in the short run is a reflection of the fact that in this time 
horizon the demand side elements of this market are the most important drivers of 
demand for housing since housing supply is given.   
The parameters estimated in the case of the VECMs highlight the lack of im-
pact of the rate of interest of the loans for housing in the short run. This phenomenon 
is along the lines of Post Keynesianism, which points to an inelastic relationship be-
tween demand for credit and the interest rate (Philip Arestis 1988).   
The results displayed in Table 4a also show the positive influence of the stock 
market, i.e. household’s financial wealth in the demand for credit. The role played by  
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this variable is particularly important in Denmark (0.517); although it is also remark-
able in France (0.404) and Australia (0.102).   
The error-correction term, which is included in all the models displayed in Ta-
ble 4a is negative as expected. Around a 14% of the disequilibria between the short-
run model and the long-run equilibrium relationship is eliminated yearly in the case 
of the Danish market. The highest value for this term appears in France (67%). The 
speed of adjustment is also high in the case of Germany and the United Kingdom (27 
and 31% respectively). The Irish and Australian markets are slightly less dynamics, 
as suggested by their error-correction terms which are around 18%. 
The error-correction models that have been presented in this section are able 
to explain between a 17-50 % of the fluctuations in the volume of bank credit in the 
short run, as indicated by the R-squared. The Durbin Watson statistic is around 2 in 
the majority of the estimated models. However, it is slightly lower for the Irish mod-
els (1.5). Table 4b also reports the AIC and the SIC of the selected models, which 
were selected on the basis of the lowest values for these statistics. All those variables 
which were included in these models are jointly significant as confirmed by the value 
of the F-statistics. Moreover, we apply the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM 
test in order to check the lack of autocorrelation of first- and second-order. Addition-
ally, the ARCH test and the White test (without and with cross terms) are also em-
ployed. All these tests confirm the lack of autocorrelation and ARCH effects of first- 
and second order, and the homocedasticity of the residuals at the 5% significance 
level. The White test with cross terms rejects the null hypothesis of homocedasticity 
in the case of Denmark. Although the results of this version of the test without cross 
terms suggest the lack of heteroskedasticity of the model. 
Finally, some general ideas can be highlighted in view of the empirical results, 
which were presented in this section. To begin with, our theoretical framework that 
captures the essence of Graziani’s (2003) writings suggests the endogeneity of bank 
credit. This premise, which is confirmed empirically, highlights how bank credit is 
led by the evolution of the demand for housing. In this context, a relevant influence 
of housing prices on bank credit is expected. This hypothesis has been confirmed by 
our results. This positive relationship also makes evident the so-called “collateral” 
channel. Additionally, a relevant impact of real residential investment, which brings 
into the model the supply side of the housing market, is also expected.  
An important impact which emanates from the households’ wealth is also 
present in view of the positive effect of share prices on bank credit. This is so since 
an increase in the value of households’ financial assets boosts demand. In addition to 
that, we could also expect an important effect of income which is one of the main 
determinants of housing affordability and also an important indicator of the capacity 
of repayment of a mortgage by a given household. 
Furthermore, our results also account for the impact of investment in real es-
tate assets and the cost of external finance, i.e. mortgage rate. In terms of the latter 
variable, its lack of impact in the short run suggests that manipulation of the interest 
rate is not the most important instruments that policy makers can utilize. This finding 
confirms the validity of the Post Keynesian view of the relationship between interest 
rates and credit.   
158  Philip Arestis and Ana Rosa González 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 2, pp. 145-160 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The objective of this contribution is to develop a theoretical framework that confirms 
the endogenous nature of the bank credit to the private sector. For this particular pur-
pose, demand for credit is related to demand for housing.  
Our analysis permits us to provide some policy recommendations in view of 
the significance of those variables, which are included in our testable hypothesis. 
Specifically, in terms of those actions that monetary authorities could implement in 
order to contribute to the prevention of the collapse of the housing market, and the 
subsequent increase of the systemic risk of the economy, this contribution suggests 
that interest rates should be settled as low and stable as possible, since the banking 
sector has to provide the liquidity, which is required to permit the functioning of the 
sphere of production without creating distortions. At first sight, this policy recom-
mendation could be controversial. However, monetary authorities may develop more 
important tasks in terms of prudential policy in order to guarantee the solvency of the 
banking sector. 
The role that monetary authorities have to play is really important since credit 
markets are far from being “perfect” and borrowers are not “rational agents”. In the 
context of asymmetric information, the conflict principal-agent gains relevance and 
there is an important necessity to reduce bankers’ incentives to take unnecessary 
risks in their attempt to increase banks’ profits. More precisely, just the value of 
those assets, which are collateralized, is not enough to guarantee the “health” and 
stability of the financial system. This has been demonstrated extensively during the 
last episodes of housing bubbles, where the prices of these assets were overvalued 
and far from their fundamentals. The key issue is not the compensation that the lend-
er could obtain in case of default; it is when the value of the asset is not its real one 
and could fluctuate sharply after the burst of the bubble. In this context, the funda-
mental task has to be identifying those borrowers that are credit-worthy, in order to 
close the “gap” between potential and solvent demand for credit in the context of 
asymmetric information. Finally, we also note that the financial system in general 
and the banking sector in particular really require better regulation. This is so since 
there is no sense in having a huge “package” of rules and mechanisms of supervision 
that are not applied in practice and eventually can end in the well-known situation of 
some banks with high property exposure (The Economist 2012). 
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